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I. INTRODUCTION
[I]f liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be
found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons
alike share in government to the utmost.'
In life, as in the legal system, equality is a concept that is more readily
articulated than attained. Equality, "the quality or state of having the same rights,
social status, etc.,"2 if held by all members of society may likely cause the
extinction of conflict.3 As such, diversity, social identity, cultural identity,
classism, and generally any grouping of differences would cease in principal.4
Thus, society seeks to ensure that the concept offairness-"treating people in a
way that does not favor some over others"'-is sought through practice and
attained whenever possible, be it through happenstance, circumstance, or
perseverance. As John F. Kennedy stated, "[i]n the long history of the world,
only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its
hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility-I welcome
it."'
Gideon v. Wainwright7 held that the accused have a right to counsel
under the Fourteenth Amendment and that states, while sovereign, must provide
counsel to indigents. The Supreme Court mandated what various jurisdictions
already practiced: providing counsel to the accused, regardless of indigency.
8 In
theory, this is a simple idea. In reality, providing legal counsel consumes
resources (i.e., money and time) that can be directed at other government
programs such as education, health care, and transportation.9 However, many
I ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. IV, at 156 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Oxford Press ed., 1908).
2 Equality, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/equality (last
visited Mar. 25, 2020).
3 Emily Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives,
in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 636-65 (Thomas Gilovich
et al. eds., 2002).
4 See Keith Hart, Money Is Always Personal and Impersonal, 23 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 12,
13 (2007); Lawrence P. Shao et al., Purchasing Power of Credit, Social Mobility, and Economic
Mobility, 12 EUR. J. Bus. RES. 73 (2012); Min Zhan, Economic Mobility of Single Mothers: The
Role ofAssets and Human Capital Development, 33 J. SOC. & Soc. WELFARE 127 (2006).
5 Fair, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fair (last visited
Mar. 25, 2020).
6 John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy (Jan. 20, 1961).
7 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
8 Ralph E. McKinney, Jr. & Lawrence P. Shao, Indigent Criminal Defense: Qualitative
Review on Economic Value, 8 EUR. J. MGMT. 146, 148 (2008).
9 Id. at 147.
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INDIGENT DEFENSE
"societies want to protect legitimate society members', within the respective
society's jurisdiction, fundamental property rights concerning criminal
prosecution."'0
This Article provides a historical overview of Public Defender Services
as the State agency primarily charged with advocating West Virginia indigent
defense programs-and aims to fulfill Gideon's promise. This Article also
provides an insider's account of the Agency's operations, obstacles, pitfalls, and
successes that arose while delivering constitutionally required legal
representation to the accused in West Virginia.
This Article proceeds by discussing the right to counsel that existed
before Gideon." The Article then turns to the American Bar Association's
guiding principles for indigent defense programs and addresses issues raised by
previous scholarship.12 Next, the Article examines the role of Public Defender
Services and its mission of providing legal representation in West Virginia.13
Additionally, as advocacy requires resources, this Article discusses the
financial and economic components of public defense programs and how they
have resulted in West Virginia's mixed method of delivering legal services.14
Finally, this Article concludes with suggestions for improving the delivery of
legal services."
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Constitution includes several protections for people suspected or
accused of crimes. This table highlights and summarizes relevant amendments.16
1o Id. at 150.
" See infra Part II.
12 See infra Part III.
' See infra Part IV.
14 See infra Part V.
1s See infra Part VI.
16 Because this Article aims to provide an in-depth account of the Public Defender Services,
discussion of these amendments will be limited to brief analysis.
2020] 843
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Amendment Right
4th Amendment Protects against arrests, searches, and seizures of
property without probable cause
5th Amendment Primary due process clause, which protects against
self-incrimination; Prohibits double jeopardy; Major
crimes require indictment
6tAmendment Right to counsel; Right to speed public trial
8th Amendment Forbids excessive bail and fines and cruel and unusual
puishment
14th Amendment Due process clause applying federal rights to the states
One of the Constitution's framers, John Adams, so fervently believed in
legal representation for the accused that as a Boston lawyer he defended the eight
British soldiers involved in the Boston Massacre on March 5, 1770.17 It is likely
that this experience provided Adams (future 2nd President of the United States)
with critical insight into the flaws of the English legal system and influenced his
input into the Constitution."
"[I]t is just as important for the state to defend the accused as to prosecute
him .... "19 We must "attempt to confirm the claims of those who are charged
with crime that they are innocent; as to confirm the charges of their guilt."
2 0
17 Mitch Kachun, From Forgotten Founder to Indispensable Icon: Crispus Attucks, Black
Citizenship, and Collective Memory, 1770-1865, 29 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 249, 251 (2009). Since
the Boston Massacre stoked tensions between the colonies and the British Crown, Adams's defense
of these soldiers was very unpopular-especially since several prominent individuals were actively
encouraging this sentiment (e.g., Paul Revere and "The Bloody Massacre" engraving). Id. at 252.
Another commentator contends that John Adams and Josiah Quincy had to consider the innate
biases of the Town of Boston against the King and Parliament; and as the soldiers were employed
by the King, they too were subject to the same biases as the King and therefore would not readily
receive a fair trial. Hiller B. Zobel, Newer Light on the Boston Massacre, 78 PROC. AM.
ANTIQUARIAN Soc'Y 119, 127 (1969).
18 John Phillip Reid, A Lawyer Acquitted: John Adams and the Boston Massacre Trials, 18
Am. J. LEGAL HiST. 189 (1974). There was no shortage of people accusing John Adams of using
the trial as a political referendum (e.g., Thomas Hutchinson, cousin of Samuel Adams). Id at 206.
19 Abram E. Adelman, In Defense of the Public Defender, 5 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 494,494 (1914).
20 Id. These words preceded Gideon v. Wainwright by approximately 49 years. Compare id.
(recognizing the need for public defenders in 1914), with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
342 (1963). Indeed, several published sources (between 1911 and 1922) debated the merits of
having programs supporting legal representation for indigents. See McKinney & Shao, supra note
8, at 146-47. The most spirited discussions centered on the administration, funding, and
appropriate staffing of such programs. For example: What would the government's role and
responsibilities encompass? Would public funds be available for legal representation? Other than
legal representation, should other services be available? In the case of the last question, the
question focuses not only on investigators and experts but also social services that consider the
causation (i.e., lack of resources, education, and lack of understanding society) of criminal activity.
[Vol. 122844
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Therefore, the judiciary must decide the standards of evidence in all cases both
civil and criminal.2 1 From here begins the germination of the idea for using public
and taxpayer funds to further facilitate the organization of legal services to even
the lowest acceptable standards as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.22
Supporting legislative reforms that support public funding for indigent criminal
defense programs, the California Law Review in 1915 wrote that "a defendant
without money has very little chance to maintain his defense."23
In 1916, more than 100 Public Defender Offices operated within the
United States, from California24 to New York.25 This was certainly a progressive
change from previous indigent defense programs that relied upon a donation of
time by attorneys and various charitable organizations, which only provided
limited assistance to the public.26 Arthur Warner, in 1926, emphatically
expressed the need for adequate legal representation that could not be influenced
from politics, police, and investigators.27 Hence came the realization that, in the
This echoes the holistic offices that focus on the entire person and not just the immediate need for
legal representation.
21 See Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REv. 103, 103 (1911)
(citing JAMES B. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 1-4, 180,
264-66 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898)).
22 Adelman, supra note 19, at 494; see also Editorial Note, The Public Defender, 3 CAL. L.
REv. 314, 315 (1915).
23 Editorial Note, supra note 22, at 315. In addition to arguing that every individual has a right
to legal representation, the author contends that public defenders are more efficient and effective
than volunteer counsel. Id.
24 Laurence A. Benner, The California Public Defender: Its Origins, Evolution and Decline,
5 CAL. LEGAL HIST. 173 (2010). Benner states that "[t]he County of Los Angeles became the first
government to establish a Public Defender office, which began providing representation in both
criminal and certain civil cases in 1914." Id. at 174. The establishment of the public defender office
is largely attributed to Clara Shortridge Foltz, id. at 174, and her 1893 Chicago World's Fair speech
advocating for an elected public defender system, id. at 175. Mortimer D. Schwartz et al., Clara
Shortridge Foltz: Pioneer in the Law, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 545 (1976). Schwartz presents an overview
of the 1870s struggle for Foltz to gain admission to law school and the bar in California. See id.
25 McKinney & Shao, supra note 8, at 148; James B. Reynolds, The Public Defender, 12 J.
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 476 (1922); Douglas Snyder, Legal Aid in the United States
(Aug. 16, 2003) (unpublished manuscript),
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p mlaapa-researchcitation/1/0/6/8/3/pageslO6837/plO68
37-1.php [https://perma.cc/E68E-LALC].
26 See Adelman, supra note 19, at 495; Reynolds, supra note 25, at 477; Snyder, supra note
25, at 22.
27 Arthur Warner, Paving the Way, 123 NATION 266 (1926). This is in response to a case in
Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839 (Mass. 1926), where Warner asserts that
there was indeed a significant judicial issue as "[w]ith any one man there may be a single
miscarriage of justice, but there can hardly be two." Warner, supra, at 266. This reference was
made in concerning the methods used to prosecute the case, the (in)actions of the defense attorney,
and the verdict. Id. at 266-67. Vanzetti was found guilty of two separate crimes: murder at South
Braintree and attempted robbery at Bridgewater. Id. at 266. Warner offers this answer:
2020] 845
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U.S. legal system, a conflict of interest prevented a prosecutor from also acting
as a defense attorney.28 It became imperative that prosecutors not have "double
roles" and the addition of taxpayer funded full-time Public Defenders were
necessary to ensure adequate representation in criminal judicial proceedings.
2 9
Furthermore, the legal representation of indigent persons should not be
substandard but beyond a minimum level of quality guaranteed by law.
30
"We have a wealth-based system of justice.. . . For the wealthy, it's
gold-plated. For the average poor person, it's like being herded to the
slaughterhouse."3 1
III. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S TEN PRINCIPLES
More recently, in February 2002, the American Bar Association
("ABA") approved a set of ten guiding principles (the "Principles"), described
No, a miscarriage of justice is not likely to happen twice to the same man if it
be in different parts of the country, on different charges, and at different times.
But it is more than likely to happen in any one neighborhood and at a given
time, especially when that time is one of hysteria and there is a widespread
community desire to get rid of a particular man or group of men.
Id. In fact, Warner notes that a lack of advocacy on the defense, the failure to fail timely objections,
the lack of real evidence against the defendant, and the failure of the system to reconcile that despite
Vanzettit's alibi and number of witnesses testifying for him, he was still convicted. Id. at 266-67.
28 Mayer C. Goldman, The Need for a Public Defender, 128 NATION 131, 131 (1929)
[https://perma.cc/UQG5-F3D6]. Goldman presents the case of Charles F. Stielow convicted of
murder in New York and subsequently pardoned by Governor Whitman. Id. at 131. By Goldman's
account, Stielow was convicted from "a 'third-degree' confession," which seems to mean hearsay
evidence. Id.
29 Id. at 132. Goldman also notes that Alfred Schwitofsky received a commuted sentence from
Governor Whitman based on the issues associated with the judicial process in which Schwitofsky
received "twenty-years for burglary and felonious assault." Id.
30 Kenneth Scott Schlesinger, Comment, Polk County v. Dodson: Liability Under Section
1983 for a Public Defender's Failure to Provide Adequate Counsel, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1291 (1982).
Schlesinger notes that the question of liability may arise when an individual (e.g., public defender,
appointed counsel, pro bono counsel, or other such representative) is engaged in providing legal
services to indigents. Id. at 1291. Considering 42 U.S.C. § 1983, various arguments concerning its
application to public defenders have been made. Id at 1291-95 (collecting cases concerning
individuals who acted "under color of state law" in violation of the Constitution and the United
States Code (citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941))).
In West Virginia, section 29-21-20 provides general immunity from suits arising from
representing indigents. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-20 (West 2020). This statue can also apply
to immunity in Federal appointments under Mooney v. Frazier, 693 S.E.2d 333 (W. Va. 2010).
For a historical review of significant events impacting indigent legal representation, see John
C. Kilwein, Indigent Access to Justice in West Virginia, 20 W. VA. Pun. AFF. REP. 2, 2-9 (2003).
31 Editorial, Too Poor to Be Defended, EcoNOMIsT (Apr. 11, 1998),
https://www.economist.com/united-states/1998/04/09/too-poor-to-be-defended. This quote is
from Stephen Bright, Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights in Atlanta. Id.
[Vol. 122846
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as "the fundamental criteria necessary to design a system that provides effective,
efficient, high quality, ethical, conflict-free legal representation for criminal
defendants who are unable to afford an attorney."32 The ten Principles are:
1. The public defense function, including the selection,
funding, and payment of defense counsel, is independent.
2. Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the public defense
delivery system consists of both a defender office and the
active participation of the private bar.
3. Clients are screened for eligibility, and defense counsel is
assigned and notified of appointment, as soon as feasible
after clients' arrest, detention, or request for counsel.
4. Defense counsel is provided sufficient time and a
confidential space within which to meet with the client.
5. Defense counsel's workload is controlled to permit the
rendering of quality representation.
6. Defense counsel's ability, training, and experience match
the complexity of the case.
7. The same attorney continuously represents the client until
completion of the case.
8. There is parity between defense counsel and the prosecution
with respect to resources and defense counsel is included as
an equal partner in the justice system.
9. Defense counsel is provided with and required to attend
continuing legal education.
10. Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed
for quality and efficiency according to nationally and locally
adopted standards.33
Former Attorney General Eric Holder cited the Principles as "the building blocks
of a well-functioning public defender system."34
32 AM. BAR Ass'N, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, at intro. (2002),
https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/ABATen Principles.pdf.
33 Id
34 Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Address at Department of Justice National Symposium on





McKinney and Baker: Indigent Defense in West Virginia: A Historical Look at Public De
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2020
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The ABA recommended "that jurisdictions use these Principles to assess
promptly the needs of public defense delivery systems and clearly communicate
those needs to policy makers."35 At least three states have directly cited to the
Principles when developing, interpreting, and enforcing their indigent defense
rules.3 6 Even the United Nations has embraced the Principles in its declarations
regarding the fundamental human right of access to justice.3 7
And yet, previous scholarship notes practitioners' relative ignorance
of-or noncompliance with-the Principles.38 Reporting on the results of a
nationwide survey, Professor Caroline S. Cooper notes that the only principle to
which a significant portion of survey respondents report adherence was the first,
regarding independence of counsel.39 Less than half of respondent attorneys
reported "completely" or "mostly" adhering to the other nine principles.
40 The
same study notes that the survey respondents actually over-estimated their
achievement, relative to performance benchmarks.41
According to Professor Cooper, survey comments suggest that public
defense providers' performance is significantly impacted by a lack of funding,
understaffmg, caseload, and management infrastructure.42 Professor Cooper
notes that these are systemic challenges, rather than issues within the control of
individual public defenders.3 Cooper thus calls for collaboration between public
defense providers and "policy makers at all levels" to address the systemic
shortcomings.44
Other researchers note that policy makers will struggle to address issues,
given the lack of consistent quality data, or even consensus on what metrics to
consider in making policy. 4 5 As Professor Jennifer E. Laurin observes:
35 AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 32.
36 State v. Lee, 879 So.2d 173, 176 n.2 (La. Ct. App. 2004); In re Regulations Governing a
Sys. for Appointment of Counsel, No. 2015-27, 2016 Mich. LEXIS 1072, at *4 (Mich. June 1,
2016); Kerr v. Parsons, 378 P.3d 1, 12-13 (N.M. 2016).
37 See Norman Lefstein, Time to Update the 'ABA Ten Principles'for the 21st Century,
40 CHAMPION 42, 42 (2016) (citing David Carroll, The United Nations Takes the Ten Principles
International, SixTH AMEND. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2013), https://sixthamendment.org/the-united-nations-
takes-the-ten-principles-international/).
38 See Caroline S. Cooper, The ABA "Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System
How Close Are We to Being Able to Put Them into Practice?, 78 ALB. L. REv. 1193, 1202 tbl.3
(2015).
3 Id. at 1202.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1203.
42 Id. at 1204.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1206.
45 See, e.g., Janet Moore & Andrew L.B. Davies, Knowing Defense, 14 OHIO ST. J. CuM. L.
345, 348-50 (2017); Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon by the Numbers: The Emergence of Evidence-
Based Practice in Indigent Defense, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 332-33 (2015).
[Vol. 122848
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[W]hile the provision of defense services is guided by an array
of influential professional standards for practice, little of that
guidance could accurately be called evidence-based as opposed
to the product of collective experience and observation. And
while indigent defense is universally viewed as underfunded, the
truth is the field lacks an objective means of quantifying how
much money its services do or should cost, or what a reduction
in the ability to provide particular services means from the
standpoint of quality.46
Nadine Frederique, Patricia Joseph, and R. Christopher C. Hild note that it is
difficult to draw general conclusions from most studies of indigent defense
systems because of the specificity of each study.47 Alissa Worden, Andrew
Davies, and Elizabeth Brown also identify the patchwork-nature of indigent
defense:
[S]tates are not only permitted broad discretion in key policy
decisions, such as how much they pay for defender services, but
they may also choose to devolve responsibility for such
decisions -and, indeed, for the provision of defender services
themselves -to the local and county level. In other words, states
not only vary among themselves; they may also, at their
discretion, permit further variation within themselves.48
Thus, it is common to see research focus on jurisdiction-specific data and
outcomes, with an eye on jurisdiction-specific policy.4 9
It is with this context that the Authors discuss West Virginia's public
defense system, which is virtually non-existent in the existing literature. The
Authors hope that researchers and policy makers find the information and insight
discussed herein-much of which is based on Author McKinney's personal first-
hand experiences as Director of Operations of the West Virginia Public Defender
46 Laurin, supra note 45, at 336 (internal citations omitted).
47 Nadine Frederique et. al., What Is the State of Empirical Research on Indigent Defense
Nationwide? A Brief Overview and Suggestions for Future Research, 78 ALB. L. REv. 1317, 1329
(2015).
48 Alissa Pollitz Worden et al., A Patchwork of Policies: Justice, Due Process, and Public
Defense Across American States, 74 ALB. L. REv. 1423, 1428 (2011).
49 See, e.g., Kelly G. Carmena, The New Face ofLouisiana's Public Defender Board: Indigent
Defense and the 2016 Reform, 44 S.U. L. REv. 75 (2016); Bonnie C. Groller, Cosmetic Repair to
a Crumbling Foundation: A Critical Examination of Idaho's Most Recent Indigent Defense
Legislation, 52 IDAHO L. REv. 669(2016); Laurin, supra note 45 (examining Texas, North Carolina,
and New York); Zachary Phillips, Why Does Florida Have Public Defender Elections?, 26 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 322 (2014); Susan L. Wynne & Michael S. Vaughn, Eligibility for Court-
Appointed Counsel in Federal Cases: A Review ofLegislation and Case Law, 80 ALB. L. REv. 899
(2017) (discussing public defender programs at the federal level); see also Frederique et al., supra
note 47, at 1328-30 (discussing a number of such studies).
2020] 849
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Services ("PDS")-relevant to the nationwide conversation regarding indigent
defense funding, structure, and metrics for performance measurement.
IV. THE WEST VIRGINIA INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM
In West Virginia,
[t]rials of crimes, and of misdemeanors . .. shall be by a jury of
twelve men, public, without unreasonable delay, and in the
county where the alleged offence was committed, unless upon
petition of the accused, and for good cause shown, it is removed
to some other county. In all such trials, the accused shall be fully
and plainly informed of the character and cause of the
accusation, and be confronted with the witnesses against him,
and shall have the assistance of counsel, and a reasonable time
to prepare for his defence; and there shall be awarded to him
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.so
Even though West Virginia has expressed a commitment to the concept of
indigent defense, this commitment cannot be accomplished without some
method of actually delivering legal representation to those individuals to whom
this commitment was made. To fulfill its Constitutional obligations,1 the West
Virginia Legislature has charged PDS with the responsibility of indigent
representation.52
But before PDS was established, an Agency known as the Public Legal
Services Council served that function.53
The legislature finds and declares that in certain proceedings the
state is required to provide high quality legal assistance to
indigent persons who would be otherwise unable to afford legal
counsel; that providing legal representation to those who face an
economic barrier to adequate legal counsel will serve the ends
so W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14 (emphasis added). Prior to 1981, Public Defender Corporations
did not exist, and the appointed counsel made claims to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia.
5' Id.
52 For a historical overview, see Kilwein, supra note 30.
S3 The Public Legal Services Council was a direct result of State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227
S.E.2d 314 (W. Va. 1976):
We are confident that the Legislature, given the full opportunity to carefully
scrutinize all of the probative aspects of the need for a revised delivery system
for legal counsel for indigent defendants, will wisely exercise its prerogative
to assure the continuing administration of the system of criminal justice in
West Virginia.
Id. at 323. The primary question presented to the court focused on the clarification of indigence
and secondly how to determine and confirm indigence. Id. Prior to Partain, appointed counsel
received up to $100 per misdemeanor and $200 per felony. Id. at 318.
[Vol. 122850
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of justice in accordance with rights and privileges guaranteed to
all citizens by the Constitution of the United States of America
and the constitution of the state of West Virginia; that the
availability of quality legal assistance reaffirms the faith of our
citizens in our government of laws; that the present system
which utilizes appointed counsel is not operating satisfactory in
some areas of this state and the legislature is presently unable to
determine what system or systems will provide the most
efficient means for providing legal representation; that there is a
need to explore alternative methods of delivering legal
assistance including the use of salaried public defenders
complemented by private panel attorneys; that innovative
programs and pilot projects as well as a continuation of the
present appointed counsel system are necessary in separate areas
of the state to provide information and experience upon which
to base future legislative actions.5 4
The Public Legal Services Council was "reorganized as a result of
Chapter 169, Acts, Regular Session, 1989, amended by Chapter 154, Acts;
Regular Session 1990; and Chapter 209, Acts, Regular Session, 1996" as the
Public Defender Services.55 The West Virginia Public Defender Services
("PDS") was established July 1, 1981,56 as the state agency responsible for
administering legal representation for eligible proceedings. The programs
targeted indigent persons accused of crimes (State & Municipal Courts); persons
before Mental Hygiene Commissioners; all juveniles in any judicial proceeding;
all parties involved in abuse & neglect proceedings (both parents and children);
and in miscellaneous proceedings-probation/parole revocation, contempts of
court, extradition, and proceedings "ancillary" to eligible proceedings
(appeals/habeas corpus, forfeiture, and expungement proceedings).59
The organization of PDS is discussed below.
54 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-1 (West 2020).
5 In 1989, West Virginia enacted legislation that created Public Defender Services. W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 29-21-3 (West 2020) ("There is hereby created an executive agency known as public
defender services.").
56 Id. § 29-21-1.
57 Id. § 29-21-14.
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A. The Organizational Structure and Function ofPDS
PDS is an executive agency within the Department of Administration.
6 0
While one might envision an organizational schematic showing legal services
being delivered by staff attorneys leading directly to the office of the Executive
Director, who manages the agency, this is far from the reality of PDS.
PDS is managed by an Executive Director61 appointed by the Governor
and confirmed by the Senate.62 To be considered for the position of Executive
Director, an individual "shall be a qualified administrator as determined by the
governor, and shall be a member of the bar of the supreme court of appeals."
6 3
Although the qualifications seem specific, they are ambiguous. First, the
administrator's qualifications are determined by the governor,
6 4 with the
implication that it is solely the governor's prerogative to determine the personnel
specifications and criteria that may be used in selecting the Executive Director.
Second, while the statute requires the Executive Director to be a member of the
Bar of the Supreme Court of Appeals, it does not stipulate whether the individual
must be a member in good standing, nor does it specify to which classification
of membership that the individual must hold.6 5 Furthermore, the Code does not
specify that the individual must be able to practice law.
66 Finally, this section
specifies the conditions for becoming Executive Director, but it is not clear
whether a person serving temporarily as "Acting Executive Director" must meet
the same qualifications.6 7
PDS has three distinct units: the Criminal Law Research Center,
6 8 the
Accounting and Auditing Division,6 9 and the Appellate Advocacy Division.
70
60 Id § 5F-2- 1 (a)(7) (incorporating Public Defender Services as part of the Department of
Administration).
61 Id. § 29-21-5. At the writing of this paper, there have been four Executive Directors-
Michael Frasher (1981-1989), John "Jack" A. Rogers (December 1989-December 2010), Russell
S. Cook (January 201 1-April 2013), and Dana F. Eddy (July 2013-present). Cook was appointed
as Acting Executive Director during his tenure. After Cook stepped down as Executive Director,
the Deputy Cabinet Secretary of Administration Cedric Greene oversaw the Agency until the
appointment of Eddy. As such, the Fiscal Year 2014 contracts with Public Defender Corporations
werejointly signed by Cedric Greene of the Department of Administration and Ralph E. McKinney
of PDS.






68 Id §§ 29-21-6(c), 29-21-7. It should be noted that both sections contain similar functions
except the latter has greater specificity as to those functions.
69 Id. § 29-21-6(d).
70 Id § 29-21-6(e).
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The Criminal Law Research Center ("CLRC") is charged7 1 with
providing legal research materials, the production of publications, and low cost
continuing legal education. The purpose of the CLRC was to act as a facilitator
of knowledge through a coordinated effort of researching, analyzing, and
distributing materials in written form and through training programs.7 2
Moreover, CLRC is tasked with offering this knowledge at low rates to foster
participant (i.e., employees and non-employees) knowledge and program
improvements.73 In an effort to present continuing legal education, the CLRC
hosts an Annual Public Defender Conference in West Virginia.7 4
The Accounting and Auditing Division is responsible for financial
oversight which includes both the Public Defender Corporations and other
parties receiving funds from the PDS. Additionally, this unit is responsible for
the preparation of the Agency's Annual Report and recordkeeping.76 Due to the
growth and complexity of the Agency, this unit was split administratively into
Operations and Public Defender Corporations and Accounting and Voucher
Processing divisions. 7
Id. § 29-21-7. CLRC is the only unit within PDS having a re-appropriated special revenue
account-that is, an unexpiring account that may collect fees for materials and services and to
expend such funds in carrying out the functions of CLRC. The CLRC Directors were Elizabeth
Zuccari Murphy, John "Jack" A, Rogers, Russell S. Cook, and Donald L. Stennett.
72 Id
7 Id.
74 Author McKinney attended the 2010 Annual Public Defender Conference in Charleston,
West Virginia. See W. VA. PUB. DEF. SERVS., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2010),
http://www.wvlegislature.gov/legisdocs/reports/agency/P07_FY_2010_1031 .pdf [hereinafter
PDS, 2010 REPORT]. That year, the participants were greeted on their first day by various law
enforcement personnel. A series of actions had led the police and other law enforcement personnel
to the conference area. Unbeknownst to the conference attendees, the United National Bank (just
a few blocks away) had just been allegedly robbed. While fleeing, the alleged suspect entered the
Embassy Suite's premise via side kitchen door, then passed through the main conference area
where many criminal defense attorneys and various Circuit Court judges and at least one Supreme
Court Justice were gathered for a continental breakfast, before being apprehended. Ironically, the
suspect created what is believed to be the largest conflict of interest issue in West Virginia history,
as the over 200 criminal defense attorneys and judges attending were all potential witnesses to the
criminal activity. W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.7 (2018).
7 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-6(d).
76 The Annual Report focuses on compliance with the state's statutory reporting requirements.
See id § 5-1-20 (West 2020) (listing these requirements).
n The Accounting and Auditing Division was operated as a single unit at first. However, with
the activations and subsequent operations of additional Public Defender Corporations, increased
number of attorneys participating as appointed counsel, more service providers acting as experts
and rendering services to the legal program, and finally the increases in funding appropriations
from the Legislature, as Executive Director, Jack Rogers separated the responsibilities into two
functional and distinct areas: (1) Agency Operations including monitoring Public Defender
Corporations and (2) Accounting & Voucher Processing for Appointed Counsel and service
2020] 853
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The Appellate Advocacy Division focuses on providing legal
representation to eligible clients in the Supreme Court of Appeals." The types
and number of cases is determined at the discretion of the Executive Director.
Traditionally, this division focuses on appealing criminal convictions to the
Supreme Court and in some instances Circuit Courts, advocating the
enforcement of federal Habeas Corpus rights, and providing advice and litigation
support to other practitioners (both in Public Defender Corporations and appoint
counsel) concerning cases.
providers. The decision was based on the ability to manage operations while providing customer
service to the respective parties.
Operations and Public Defender Corporations - General operations includingfiscal management
(managing accounts payable, procurement under § 148 CSR Series 1, and maintaining property
schedules such as fixed assets); Human Resource Management such as maintaining personnel and
leave records, assisting with selection processes, and acting as agency liaison for personnel matters;
Records Management; Technology Management; and so forth. Other operational issues include
supporting the Indigent Defense Commission; acting as editor for Agency Annual Report;
producing research and reports as required and desired; and assisting with audits and investigations
of appointed counsel claims.
This unit was also responsible for financial oversight of 17 Public Defender Corporations (22 sites)
serving 18 of 31 Judicial Circuits (29 of 55 counties) within West Virginia. This includes the
contracts, budgeting, and funding for corporations; resolving some global technology issues for
corporations; maintaining databases (using TimeMatters programs) for compiling statutory
statistical reports; providing training and education to staff and interested parties; and providing
general support and strategies to corporations.
There have been two Directors of operations: Kellie J. Carper and Ralph E. McKinney, Jr.
Accounting & Voucher Processing - Functions include overseeing the appropriation and
expenditures requests and schedules; processing claims from appointed counsel and service
providers; preparing reports according to statutory requirements using Appointed Counsel Claims
Tracking System ("ACCTS"); facilitate the use of the Online Voucher Submission System ("OVS")
effective April 2, 2012, in processing claims; and the processing of IRS Form 1099s for appointed
counsel and service providers.
The Directors were Dana Smith and Kitty Wilson.
Around October 2014, both units within the Accounting & Auditing Division were reintegrated
under Executive Director Dana Eddy with Director Kitty Wilson managing some operations.
Moreover, some tasks (e.g., human resource functions) were placed within CLRC, other functions
(e.g., conducting research and compiling reports) were placed in a new unit known as Special
Projects, and other functions (i.e., helping maintain a strong relationship with the Public Defender
Corporations) simply ceased.
78 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-6(e) (West 2020). Although PDS has operated the Appellate
Advocacy Division, it was not until July 1, 2014, that PDS hired additional positions (i.e., four
attorneys and two staff). Prior to July 1, 2014, the primary entity serving as in this capacity in the
matters for Statewide Appellate Advocacy was the Public Defender Corporation for the 13th
Judicial Circuit or commonly referred to as the Kanawha County Public Defender Office. An
important distinction to make is that Public Defender Corporations are autonomous entities from
PDS. Public Defender Corporations are discussed further in Part V.
The Appellate Advocacy Division Directors were Frank W. Helvey, Jr., Jack Hickok, Richard
Lorensen, and Duane C. Rosenlieb, Jr.
[Vol. 122854
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss3/8
INDIGENT DEFENSE
To advise PDS, the West Virginia Legislature established the Indigent
Defense Commission.79 This Commission is composed of nine members,
including the Executive Director of PDS whom serves as the Commission
Chair.80 The primary purpose of the Commission is reviewing agency operations
and the delivery systems (i.e., Public Defender Corporations and appointed
counsel) for legal representation.8 ' The Commission was to review a number of
issues and to report their findings on or before January 15, 2009.82
PDS, as a State Agency, provides overall direction for the agency and
the representation of indigents in eligible proceedings by non-state personnel or
panel counsel and agencies. In the next Part, discussions focus on the mixed
system of these non-state stakeholders.
B. Appointed Counsel and Public Defender Corporations: The Front-Line
Troops of Indigent Defense in West Virginia
Indigent defense programs make "use of salaried public defenders
complimented by private panel attorneys."83 Thus, in West Virginia a mixed
system composed of appointed counsel (private panel attorneys) and Public
Defender Corporations (governmentally established non-profit organizations)
work in conjunction to deliver legal representation to eligible indigents. In some
instances, a conflict of interest may create a need to have separate legal
representation, usually by panel attorneys.84
79 Id. § 29-21-3b. The Indigent Defense Commission was established July 1, 2008. Id. § 29-
21-3b(a) (West 2020) (establishing "the Indigent Defense Commission to provide assistance to
Public Defender Services with regard to the general policies and procedures of the agency").
80 Id. § 29-21-3b(b). Membership is composed of eight individuals appointed by the governor
and the Executive Director of PDS whom serves as the Chair of the Indigent Defense Commission.
On July 1, 2008, the Indigent Defense Commission consisted of John "Jack" A. Rogers, Esq.,
Executive Director of PDS serving as Chair (ex officio); The Honorable Andrew A. MacQueen,
Esq., Retired Circuit Judge (term ending June 30, 2013); William B. Richardson, Esq., Attorney,
1st Congressional District (term ending June 30, 2013); Joseph M. Ward, Esq., Attorney, 2nd
Congressional District (term ending June 30, 2014); Robert E. Richardson, Esq., Attorney, 3rd
Congressional District (term ending June 30, 2014); Adrienne Worthy, Non-Lawyer (term ending
06/30/2011); James Strawn, Mental Illness Advocate (term ending June 30, 2011); Cathryn S.
Nogay, Esq., Abuse and Neglect Attorney (term ending June 30, 2012); and Deborah A. Lawson,
Esq., Chief Defender (term ending June 30, 2012). As a law clerk, Judge MacQueen helped draft
the Partain decision that eventually established PDS. PDS, 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 5.
8 Id. § 29-21-3b(a).
82 Id § 29-21-3b(g).
83 Id. § 29-21-1.
84 For example, three individuals are arrested for drug possession and subsequently found
eligible as indigent for legal representation. Assuming a Public Defender Corporation is located
within that circuit, one individual should be represented by that Public Defender Corporation. For
the other two individuals, appointments should be made from the list of private panel attorneys.
Even though a Public Defender Corporation is located within a judicial circuit, that office cannot
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In this system the court determines eligibility for services;15 the judiciary
then makes the appointment for legal representation in accordance with the
statute.86 Indigent guidelines help establish uniform standards for determining
indigence for both Public Defender and appointed counsel. Appointed Counsel
and Public Defender systems are described separately below.
1. Appointed Counsel System
The appointed counsel system is a program composed of attorneys that
are willing to serve as legal representatives to individuals in cases where
represent all eligible individuals without jeopardizing the quality of legal representation created
from a conflict of interest. A Public Defender Corporation cannot eliminate the need for private
panel attorneys.
85 Id. § 29-21-16. Eligibility determination considers income, assets, and circumstances when
making a decision in appointing legal representation. At the discretion of the judge, the individual
may be appointed legal representation even if his/her financial circumstances exceed eligibility
guidelines set by PDS. Alternatively, an individual may be found indigent for legal expenditures
and not legal fees under Rojas v. Wilkes, 455 S.E.2d 575 (W. Va. 1995). These claims are processed
as direct bills and are referred to as "Rojas vouchers." See id.
86 Id. § 29-21-9(b). The following is the preferential method to appoint legal representation. A
public defender office within the circuit; a panel attorney within the circuit; a panel attorney located
within the region; a public defender office in an adjoining circuit; a panel attorney from an
adjoining circuit; and an attorney in any circuit.
87 PDS is responsible for establishing and reviewing financial guidelines for determining
indigence. Id. § 29-21-16(a). These guidelines follow the Federal Poverty Level ("FPL") guidelines
as issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for other such federal programs
aimed at assisting the indigent. As a practical matter, PDS set guidelines at the 1994 150% FPL.
Although it would be easy to argue for increasing these guidelines to reflect a more current
representation of indigence, the practical matter of acquiring increased funding as a result of
making more individuals eligible for the program was not economically feasible to many political
stakeholders. As in politics, energies are channeled into what is valuable and what can be acquired.
Furthermore, judges already had the authority to make findings of indigence in individual cases;
and therefore, the political strategy that was more acceptable was to allow the judiciary to become
the gatekeepers for determining indigence. PDS did raise the FPL on October 1, 2013. As a result,
the 2013 125% FPL guidelines replaced the previous 1994 guidelines. Although the new guidelines
were set 25% lower than the 1994 guidelines, the increases made minimum impact on the number
of accused eligible for legal counsel.
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indigence is determined.8 8 Appointed counsel" are compensated for time90 and
expenditures91 by PDS9 2 up to the statutory payment limits. 9 3 To receive
compensation, the appointed counsel submits a claim by voucher to the local
Circuit Court.94 The appointed counsel system was not designed to provide a
revenue source for attorneys but to provide a reasonable compensation for
accepting indigent cases.95 The hourly compensation rates established over 25
years ago include overhead expenditures.
88 Id § 29-21-9. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF THE W. VA. JUDICIAL Sys., FINAL REPORT 64
(1998), http://www.courtswv.gov/court-administration/ReportAll.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
Within the appointed counsel system, there are over 800 lawyers and service providers. Id.
89 Attorneys acting as appointed counsel for indigents have no employment relationship with
PDS. Additionally, there is no contractual relationship (i.e., vendor and customer) with PDS.
Furthermore, those individuals (i.e., experts, investigators, and paralegals) contracted with the
attorney for services still must work with that attorney to either be compensated directly by that
attorney or file a direct claim with PDS.
90 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-13a. An attorney's time is compensated at a rate of $60 per hour
for out of court time, see id § 29-21-13a(j)(1), and $80 per hour for in court time, see id § 29-21-
13a(j)(2). The attorney's time is considered "fees."
91 Id § 29-21-13a(e). Although examples of expenditures are given within the statute, the
amounts may be determined by PDS, the Travel Management Office of the Department of
Administration, the State Auditor, or some other party. In either event, it is always a wise choice
to contact PDS to understand what an expense entails and what records must be submitted.
92 PDS processes most claims using the first-in and first-out system where a received date
stamped by PDS is imprinted on the claim. Priority is given to abuse and neglect claims. See id.
§ 29-21-13a(i).
93 Id. § 29-21-13a(j)(4). The limit is set at $3,000 in fees for anything that is not a felony "for
which a penalty of life imprisonment may be imposed." Id. For such felonies, it is at the discretion
of the court. Id. Additionally, it is also at the discretion of the court to make exceptions to the
maximum limit on a per case basis. Id. For expenditures, the limit is $1,500.00 unless the Court
agrees to exceed that limit. Id. § 29-21-13a(k).
94 Each Circuit operates differently with respect to claims to PDS. In some instances, those
claims are forwarded by the Circuit Clerk directly to PDS. In other instances, these claims are
returned to the attorney and it is the attorney's responsibility to submit to PDS. The problem with
attorney submissions is sometimes they are lost, untimely, never submitted, or altered. Altered
documents are beyond the scope of this work; although the authors contemplate further exploration
of the issue in subsequent scholarship.
The vouchers submitted to PDS constitute a public record that are subject to FOIA. See Darrell V.
McGraw, Jr., The West Virginia Freedom of Information Act, OFFICE OF THE ATT'y GEN. (2004).
"Completed vouchers for legal fees and expenses submitted by an attorney to Public Legal Services
for reimbursement, and the agency's audit of those vouchers, are 'public records' and thus
accessible to the public under the WV-FOIA." Id. at 12 (citing 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 112 (Apr. 11,
1986)).
95 Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989). After Jewell, "no lawyer in West Virginia
may be involuntarily appointed to a case unless the hourly rate of pay is at least $45 per hour for
out-of-court work and $65 per hour for in-court work." Id. at 546-47. Recent legislation increased
these rates to $60 for out-of-court work and $80 for in-court work. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-
13a(j)(l)2) (West 2020). Nevertheless, these rates are still below the recommendations of the
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2. Public Defender Corporations
"In each judicial circuit of the state; there is hereby created a public
defender corporation of the circuit .... "9 6
Currently, there are 17 Public Defender Corporations,9 7 which are
considered non-state agencies.9 8 Public Defender Corporations are managed by
a board of directors composed of not less than five individuals.
99 The Chair is
appointed by the Governor with the remaining members appointed by the County
Indigent Defense Commission. See Letter from John A. Rogers, Chair, W. Va. Indigent Defense
Commission, to Hon. Robin Davis, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
(May 24, 2010) (on file with authors).
96 § 29-21-8(a)(1). Thus, by code, the legislature chartered a Public Defender Corporation in
each of West Virginia's 31 judicial circuits. Those Public Defender Corporations are dormant until
activated by several triggering events. First, both the Indigent Defense Commission and the
Executive Director of PDS must approve the creation of a Public Defender Corporation. Second,
the legislature must receive a report from the Indigent Defense Commission concerning the
approval of the Public Defender Corporation. Third, the judge or chief judge must be consulted
and issue recommendations for the Indigent Defense Commission to consider. See id. § 29-21-
8(b).
Prior to the reforms of 2008, the Indigent Defense Commission did not exist and the process of
activating a Public Defender Corporation was significantly less challenging.
As a "public body" under section 29B-1-2(3), a Public Defender Corporation is subject to the
Freedom of Information Act. See Queen v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 365 S.E.2d 375 (W. Va.
1987). However, there are exceptions to FOIA requests. § 29B-1-4; McGraw, supra note 94.
7 Currently, Public Defender Corporations operate within 19 of the state's judicial circuits.
PD Corporation Directory, PUB. DEF. SERVS., https://pds.wv.gov/Public-Defender-
Corporations/pdcorpdirectory/Pages/default.aspx.
98 The term "[n]on-state agency" denotes an autonomous organization that supports a state
agency's mission. Often, the term "quasi-governmental organization" is used interchangeably.
Regardless of terminology, the concept is that these entities are clearly constructed organizational
instruments used in carrying out state objectives and missions.
Nevertheless, the term "non-state agency" can apply to any organization that is not directly under
the Legislature, Judiciary, Executive branches of the State. A non-state agency can be a county or
municipal government and selected non-profit entities created for the purpose of assisting in the
delivery of government services and programs. In contrast, the term "quasi-governmental" is a
hybrid of public and private entity. That is, it is a joint venture where the government contributes
more than resources, but also contributes leadership in this entity. In some cases, as in the Public
Defender Corporations, the governing board is composed of members that are politically
appointed. Therefore, while all quasi-governmental organizations are also non-state agencies, not
all non-state agencies are quasi-governmental organizations.
Whichever term is used to identify these Public Defender Corporations, they are considered
component units of PDS. As a result of Public Defender Corporations being component units, each
is required to be included in the State's ConsolidatedAnnual FinancialReport (CAFR). The CAFR
is a critical financial document that determines the State's financial health and well-being as far as
decisions on bond ratings and interest rates rely on the audited information contained within these
Financial Statements. The CAFR is compiled by the Financial Accounting and Reporting Section
(FARS) of the Department of Administration.
99 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-15.
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Commission and the local County Bar Association (or by Circuit Court if no
County Bar Association exists) in equal numbers.0 0 It is expected that board
members establish macro-policies and the strategies for operations'0 1 and comply
with the nonprofit statues.1 0 2 Additionally, the Board is ultimately responsible
for personnel matters but not representation in individual cases.103
too Id § 29-21-15(a)(1). Appointments of board members directly corresponds to the number
of counties in which the Public Defender Corporations shall serve.
101 Id. § 29-21-15(c). The code specifically notes that the board "shall not interfere with any
attorney's professional responsibilities to clients."
102 Id. § 29-21-15(d). In practice, each Public Defender Corporation files with the Internal
Revenue Service as a non-profit entity under I.R.C. § 501(c)3. Additionally, the IRS has
determined that Public Defender Corporations also are § 509(a)(1) entities-an organization that
receives all or a majority of funding from a governing body, in this case, West Virginia. Filing
with the IRS has been difficult as the filing requirement includes the submission of the Articles of
Incorporation and State Charter. As noted earlier, West Virginia Code section 29-21-8 incorporates
Public Defender Corporations by statute. Even with submitting copies of the statue, letters, and
explanations, the concept of the quasi-government entity was still new to the I.R.S.
103 Id § 29-21-15(c)(1)-(3). In addition to hiring and firing authority, the board also has
responsibility for "fixing of professional and clerical salaries." Contrary to popular belief, the
Executive Director of PDS has limited authority concerning the individual salaries of employees
of Public Defender Corporations.
In the opinion of author McKinney, based on his first-hand experiences as Director of Operations
for PDS, the greatest power that the Executive Director has is the power of the purse and the ability
to contract with Public Defender Corporations. To help illustrate this concept, the attaching of
budgets and salary schedules to the contract became a routine practice under the Executive Director
Jack Rogers and Director of Operations Kellie Carper, due to the potential for reduced state
appropriations. Legal services provided by Public Defender Corporations could drastically be
reduced by a reduction in funding. By the very nature of the organization being a service provider
and the need to employ qualified professional staff, reductions would most likely impact personnel.
Additionally, it was essential for Public Defender Corporations to look beyond the annual budget
and create more strategic long-term plans of operations. Moreover, some offices did not fully
comprehend personnel decisions. As such, PDS responded by establishing internal compensation




McKinney and Baker: Indigent Defense in West Virginia: A Historical Look at Public De
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2020
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [
In the subsequent figure,10 4 the last Public Defender Corporation was
established in Fiscal Year 2001.o5 The largest spike in new offices occurred

















Figure 1: PDS Growth by Fiscal Year
With respect to personnel, the complement of employees of Public
Defender Corporations range from Public Defenders,'
06 Assistant Public
Defenders,'07 investigators, social workers, paralegals, sentencing advocates,
104 W. VA. PUB. DEF. SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012-2013, at 13 (2013),
https://pds.wv.gov/Documents/201`3%20ANNUAL%20REPORT.pdf [hereinafter McKINNEY,
ANNUAL REPORT].
1os Although the Public Defender Corporation for the 4th Judicial Circuit has appointed a board
of directors and has selected a Chief Defender, it has not been included in this figure since it is still
being formed.
106 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-2(5) (West 2020) (defining "[p]ublic defender" as a "staff
attorney employed on a full-time basis by a public defender corporation who, in addition to
providing direct representation to eligible clients, has administrative responsibility for the
operation of the public defender corporation").
107 Id. § 29-21-2(6) ("A staff attorney providing direct representation to eligible clients whose
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accountants, bookkeepers, administrators, office managers, and secretaries. os
These positions are considered employees of the Public Defender Corporations
and not of Public Defender Services nor West Virginia.1 09 Furthermore, West
Virginia Code section 29-21-17 specifically forbids full-time attorneys employed
by Public Defender Corporations to engage in the practice of law for personal
financial gain."10
Public Defender Corporations are funded through Legislative general
appropriations to PDS and subsequently through grants to Public Defender
Corporations."' Grants to Public Defender Corporations are disbursedl2 after
the approval of a funding application and proposed budget.
In the next section, discussion focuses on funding these indigent defense
programs.
108 The classification of public defender personnel has been of particular concern to PDS
management. On contracts, the number of authorized positions was simply broken into attorneys
and secretaries. It was PDS management's belief that more information was needed concerning the
duties and responsibilities of the secretaries. After surveying the Public Defender Corporations, it
was decided that a basic classification system was necessary. Therefore, the various job titles as
noted were created to reflect what was in practice. This was also a strategic move as PDS could
more readily identify to the Legislature the types of specialized positions and functions each Public
Defender Corporation was using. It became easier to justify additional salaries paid to an
investigator or social worker than a secretary or receptionist. Furthermore, PDS does not fund
outside investigators if Public Defender Corporations have investigators on staff
109 The employment relationship is a common misconception with external stakeholders having
the belief that PDS made personnel decisions and employed public defenders. In fact, PDS was
sued for the release of a Public Defender Corporation employee's personnel file, to which PDS
replied, "This person was never employed by this Agency." Additionally, PDS was the recipient
of several tax levies, garnishments, and informational requests concerning individuals that were
never employed by PDS. Moreover, the only common link among these individuals is that they
were attorneys; and somehow, PDS could magically help the requestor.
110 Although there are narrow exceptions to this (e.g., pro bono work, remit fees to Public
Defender Corporation, and the closing and disposing of cases within 90 days by newly hired
attorneys), it is only the board of directors that have the authority to make these exceptions.
Similarly, the prohibition of engaging in the private practice of law has also be applied to
employees of PDS.
III W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-13.
112 Public Defender Corporations normally received grant disbursements on a monthly basis.
However, it was necessary to issue additional supplemental disbursements based on unusual
caseloads and circumstances. Likewise, grants were also reduced when the need for resources was
anticipated to be less. Essentially, it was important that PDS and the Public Defender Corporations
have a good working relationship that allows for shared management and efficient use of resources.
Furthermore, it should be noted that any funds disbursed were used to meet the maximum spending
plan (also known as the budget). As noted, the adjustments of disbursements allowed PDS to shift
funds to other areas of operations. This philosophy discouraged the "spend it or lose it" mentality
associated with publicly funded programs.
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C. Financing Indigent Defense Programs
Funding indigent defense programs in West Virginia is done through
Legislative Appropriations from General Revenues. The table below illustrates
the general appropriation history of PDS.11
3 While appropriations have increased
over time, there have been instances of legislative reductions (FY 2000-2003)
and static budgets (FY 1995-1997 and FY 2008-2011). Furthermore, this table
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Figure 2: PDS Appropriation History
Each year, PDS must fund both the court-appointed counsel and Public
Defender Corporations from funds allocated by the State Legislature.'
14
113 McKINNEY, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 104, at 17. This figure does not include
supplemental appropriations. In 1990, Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989), caused
the rates to increase and the need for increases in funding; and as such, this is represented as the
larger red dot. In most instances, supplemental appropriations to PDS came from special revenue
sources the most common being lottery funds. In Fiscal Year 2013, PDS had received allocations
totaling $49,748,279.31 included a supplemental appropriation of $11,500,000 on March 28, 2013.
McKINNEY, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 104, at 19. The largest supplemental appropriation to the
Agency was $21,000,000. H.B. 114, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009); S.B. 1015, 79th Leg.,
1st Special Sess. (W. Va. 2009). In 2010, H.B. 118, 79th Leg., 1st Special Sess. (W. Va. 2010) and
S.B. 1018, 79th Leg., 1st Special Sess. (W. Va. 2010) made an $11,000,000 appropriation from
the same funds: "Appropriations from State Excess Lottery Revenue Fund."
114 This has created a sense of competition of funding between the appointed counsel and Public
Defender Corporations to the point that in 2010, the Legislature approved a budget bill where
appropriations were allocated in separate line-items. See PDS, 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 13.
Consequently, the need for supplemental funding for appointed counsel was still an issue. This was
not the first instance of separating legislative allocations as it had been done as early as 1995.
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Typically, questions arise concerning which system (appointed counsel or Public
Defender Corporations) is more efficient in using funding."' Figure 3 compares
the appointed counsels' cost per claiml 16 against the Public Defender
Corporations' cost per closed case."
The figure illustrates that from 1993 to 2011, the Public Defender
Corporation system was more cost effective than the appointed counsel system
in delivering legal representation to indigents. For example, the average cost per
closed case for Public Defender Corporations in 1993 was $190.25 compared to
$396.25 for appointed counsel. In 2011, the average costs were $299.32 and
$769.49 respectfully. This represents a per-case increase of $108.88 for Public
Defender cases and $373.24 for appointed counsel. Another way to consider this
is that the gap between appointed counsel and Public Defender Corporations was
$205.81 per case in 1993, but grew to $470.17 by 2011, with Public Defender
Corporation attorneys remaining more cost effective. 8 The increase is despite
the fact that appointed counsel rates did not change between 1990 and 2011.
115 This further meant that each system had to justify its existence which meant that sometimes
negative information was provided by stakeholders to increase their claims in a particular system.
116 PDS attempts to measure this cost per claim by identifying unique claims in ACCTS. See
generally supra note 77. ACCTS is an electronic databased in which all claims are entered, tracked,
and validated for payment. Consequently, this does not always work because related claims are not
always flagged as related especially with the submissions of supplemental and direct claims. For
example, misspellings, misinformation, and erroneous charges are dissimilar enough for ACCTS
to ignore those. Also, staff may not check every claim against system information (known as
conducting duplicate searchers) due to system limitations and inefficiencies, specifically the time
it takes to conduct the search. Thus, appointed counsel claims are most likely reported higher and
as a result the analysis will be skewed in favor of a lower cost per claim.
117 In many of the annual reports produced by PDS, Public Defender Corporation cost per claim
have been reported under three methods: open, represented, and closed. Under each method, the
total cost remains the same and only the denominator changes. First, open cases considers only the
number of new cases that are opened in the fiscal year being reported. Second, cases represented
counts all cases in which the Public Defender Corporation had time reported within the that fiscal
year of comparison. This means that cases opened and cases closed and working cases were
counted. Third, cases closed focus on only those cases in which the final disposition occurred
during the year of comparison. It is the authors' opinion that the comparison between appointed
counsel claims and Public Defender Corporations should be cases closed as these have more
similar characteristics to make analysis and assumptions.
In 2013, statistical reporting on Public Defender Corporations focused on cases closed and
removal of administrative time. McKINNEY, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 104. A six-year
comparison from FY 2008 to FY 2013 was presented to illustrate the differences between
appointed counsel and Public Defender Corporations. Id. at 130. Over the six years, Public
Defender Corporations spend more time (approximately 40% more (16% appointed counsel and
27% Public Defender Corporation)) in court than appointed counsel. Id. Based on the review of
data, the efficiency of Public Defender Corporations is the ability to streamline processes and spend
less out-of-court time and more time advocating for clients in court.
I1 These figures are not adjusted for inflation, and merely represent the first level of analysis
when considering a system concerning financial effectiveness. In fact, there are so many other
variables (e.g., the processing of vouchers by PDS and the judiciary, the audit costs of vouchers)
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Figure 3: Comparison of AC/PD Cost per Claim/Closed Case
To ensure that public funds are expended according to the mandates of
the West Virginia Legislature, the Legislative Auditor's Office periodically
reviews government agencies and recipients of government funds. Reviews not
only assist with ensuring compliance but also with identifying ways to improve
programs. In a 1999 report, two main issues were identified for improving the
indigent defense programs in West Virginia: "Maximum Use of Public Defender
Corporations Needed to Control Costs" and "Inadequate Monitoring of
Improvement Needs, Compliance, and Quality of Legal Services."
19 Each point
is discussed in turn.
"According to calculations by the Legislative Auditor the expansion of
Public Defender Services [by activating more Public Defender Corporations]
could realize a savings from $2,205,706 to $7,468,789.",120 As noted in Figure 3,
the Legislative Auditor also noted that appointed counsel costs well exceed that
that these figures do not reflect the true difference, but do reflect minimum differences between
the systems. Further value may be established in considering the quality of legal representation.
The difference seems to be about $250. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 65.
119 ANTONIO JONES, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF
PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES 1 (1999),
https://pds.wv.gov/about/Reports/Documents/1 999%20PDS%20Performance%2OEvaluation.pdf.
120 Id. at 7. The term savings is not a true realizable concept as my preference is cost avoidance,
as no funds would be reallocated or otherwise available for use. Furthermore, the "savings"
measured only represent direct variables and do not consider any costs associated with other
variables such as processing of vouchers by PDS and the judiciary and the time to appoint legal
representation from the private panel.
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of Public Defender Corporations.121 Moreover, the need for supplemental
appropriations and funding is necessary to cover the services already rendered
by appointed counsel.12 2
The second point focuses entirely on issues associated with monitoring,
compliance, and quality.12 3 Most of this point is directed at the appointed counsel
system and the fiduciary responsibility of PDS to ensure that abuses are
minimized.12 4 Part of this fiduciary responsibility requires metrics to ensure a
minimum standard of quality for legal representation,12 5 that the statutory
methods of appointment are followed,12 6 and comparisons between Public
Defender Corporations and appointed counsel.127
In 2004, the Legislative Auditor recommended that "[t]he Legislature
Should Consider Enhancing Its Public Defense Repayment System to Help
Reduce the Financial Burden to the State in Providing Legal Representation for
the Indigent and to Remove Inequities in Its Current Repayment System." 28
Furthermore, "the Legislative Auditor also recommends that the Legislature
implement a public defender application fee." 12 9 The Auditor claimed that if the
recommendations were implemented, an estimated $5 million would be collected
from indigents and re-appropriated for their defense.13 0 However, it appears that
seeking additional revenue streams as a condition of legal representation is
121 Id. at 24 ("[I]t is more expensive to provide legal representation to indigent clients using
appointed counsels as opposed to using state employed public defenders.").
122 Id. at 12. Ultimately, the continued need to ask the Legislature for supplemental funding
continues primarily as a result of a desire to not significantly increase the initial (or base)
appropriations in an effort to control costs. Consequently, additional strategies implemented during
the restructuring helped motivate and facilitate the approval of Legislative appropriations.
123 Id. at 31.
124 Id. The OLA noted that the circuit judges review and sign appointed counsel claims with
the burden of PDS "to require and monitor compliance" within program specifications. Id. at 32.
Although section 29-21-13a(g) provides PDS the authority, it does not provide the authority to
refuse to obey a court order; and as vouchers are codified by court order, PDS would be in contempt
of such order to pay a claim if PDS refused. With enhanced computer capability, PDS did develop
methods to identify some of these abuses.
125 Id. at 34.
126 Id. at 35. This is still an issue as many judicial circuits have inadequate methods and
technology for tracking cases.
127 Id. at 36. Subsequent to the OLA 1999 report, PDS has made comparisons part of their
Annual Report to the Governor and Legislature.
128 JOHN SYLVIA, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES 5 (2004),
https://pds.wv.gov/about/Reports/Documents/2004%20PDS%2oPerformance%2OEvaluation.pdf
129 Id. at 5.
130 Id. at 10, 20. This assumes that most fees will be collected.
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inappropriate as "the right to counsel cannot be denied" based upon the inability
for the accused to pay.13 1
Asking indigents to pay application fees for legal representation goes
against the basic philosophy of protecting the due process rights of individuals.1
32
In fact, early 1890s discussions debated whether defendants should be deprived
of any resources when charged with crimes as well as the minimum standards
for legal representation.133 "Even though the right to counsel still exists
doctrinally, the inadequate funding of indigent defense threatens what remains
of the right."1 34 Pro bono or panel counsel must necessarily ration their time
between indigent and private pay clients35-and with practice expenses and
overhead constantly looming, one is forced to question whether such attorneys
will spend most of their efforts focused on the paying clients. Therefore, ensuring
that enough resources are available for indigent defense has always been an issue
in West Virginia as well as most other states.
Consequently, the burden should not be upon the poor to raise revenues
for their own defense as "poor people are a hard constituency to organize."
36
Moreover, inefficiencies within the system must be identified and corrected to
improve the use of resources. In some cases, this means evaluating processes to
reduce waste and errors in the systems.1
3 7
131 Id. at 29. Jack Rogers, Executive Director of PDS, addressed the problems associated with
lawyers refusing a court order of representation for the failure of the client to pay and lawyers
becoming financial collection agents of West Virginia. Id. at 29-30. He also expressed concern
that the incentive to collect funds may jeopardize legal representation, as the incentive may be
greater to enter a plea bargain than to go to trial.
For a period of time after this report, PDS had to argue against the idea of application fees being
a condition of legal representation. Similarly, the same arguments could be applied to recipients of
other government benefits such as Medicaid, Food Stamps (now SNAP), and student loans. The
argument being that if an individual cannot afford an attorney, then how can that same individual
afford the application fee?
132 See McKinney & Shao, supra note 8; see also Ralph E. McKinney & Lawrence P. Shao,
Quantitative Evaluation on Indigent Criminal Defense Funding, 9 EUR. J. MGMT. 119, 120 (2009).
133 Benner, supra note 24, at 175. Clara Foltz advocated for much of this discussion. Id.
134 Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1734 (2005).
135 See Joe Margulies, Resources Deprivation and the Right to Counsel, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 673, 678-79 (1989).
136 Snyder, supra note 25.
137 According to the Commission on the Future of the West Virginia Judiciary, emphasis should
be placed on the Public Defender Corporation system and cost containment methods for both
systems but with emphasis on the appointed counsel system. FINAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 65.
Also, a significant reduction of expenditures could occur if the judiciary would fully enact
measures to reduce waiting in-court. Development of methods to ensure that recipients of legal
representation were indigent is necessary. It was recommended to identify and reduce legal counsel
to only those proceedings where it is constitutionally required with the exception of child abuse
and neglect and mental hygiene. Finally, the requirement hat the judges mandate indigents pay for
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Interestingly, though, West Virginia compares relatively well to other
communities with regard to the funding of indigent defense. Indeed, while the
"right to counsel" is a global concept... that can significantly vary among
societies,13 9 funding comparisons are nevertheless relevant to the discussion of
best practices. To illustrate this concept, the table below provides a comparison
among selected societies compiled from U.S. States and foreign nations.1 40 As
illustrated, West Virginia was at the top of the list with Texas coming near the
end. Moreover, South Africa and Venezuela expend more resources for their
programs than Texas by comparison. Thus, the use of GDP-PPP provides a
common unit for measuring how these values rank among jurisdictions.
services. is problematic as this may well exhaust, or at least diminish, the resources of those
needing legal representation. Id. at 65-66. In essence, even if the legal proceedings for the accused
end favorably, the mandated repayments create a relationship of indentured servitude between the
indigent and the State. See Shao et al., Purchasing Power ofCredit, Social Mobility, and Economic
Mobility, supra note 4, at 73.
38 The ABA's Principles have been embraced by the United Nations. See Lefstein, supra note
37, at 42.
139 McKinney & Shao, supra note 132, at 119-20. In this paper, the authors presented a
mathematic method for comparing indigent defense programs. Unlike traditional methods of
economic analysis where trade (i.e., import and export) variables, negative externalities, and other
such factors must be considered, these may be mostly discarded when considering legal work based
on a few assumptions. First, indigent programs are intangible and knowledge-based and require
specialized skill sets that are usually regulated by an entity (e.g., The West Virginia Bar). Second,
indigent defense programs are contained within a jurisdiction, that is, these programs and neither
exported nor imported. Although an argument may be made that sometimes it is necessary to make
a change in venue, the granting of such change is infrequent; and, if granted, the end result is still
under the same jurisdiction. Third, the value of the work product is insignificant to all but related
parties - the defendant, the plaintiff, the counselors, and the judges. Simply put, it cannot be sold.
Moreover, most of the consumption (i.e., the program expenditure) is limited to a geographical (or
jurisdictional) area. Fourth, the accounting for taxes and trade fees associated with the importation
and exportation of products and services is unnecessary as these programs have no interest in trade.
Id. at 120. Finally, whatever resources are expended in such program are not necessarily recouped
but function as a means of protecting individual property rights. Considering that a similar
argument of funding recoupment can be made concerning national defense (as well as police
services, fire services, and insurance policies), very few people argue for the complete
dismantlement of the military. Consequently, societies value indigent defense differently. Id. at
125.
This brings the concept of Gross Domestic Product Indexed Purchasing Power ofParity ("GDP-
PPP") to help determine the value that society places upon indigent programs. (The prices of goods
and services, as well as currency conversion, can be drastically different. Traditionally per capita
formulas have been used for comparison among programs which, without adjusting for purchasing
power, can skew results and interpretations of data. Thus, it is necessary for the conversion of data
into common units prior to making interpretations and judgements about programs. The calculation
for GDP-PPP is Total Indigent Criminal Defense Budget divided by Gross Domestic Product times
10,000 or ICD/GDP * 10,000. Id at 120-22.
140 McKinney & Shao, supra note 132, at 124. Selection of Societies from Table 5: Societies
Ranked by GDP-PPP Expressed in Local Currencies. In the original table, 41 societies were
represented with Ohio being the median or statistical central point.
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Societies Ranked by GDP-PPP Expressed in Local Currencies
Society GDP-PPP USD-Ohio
England & Wales 11.9726 $42.74
Netherlands 6.3836 $22.79




South Africa 2.8440 $10.15
Ohio 2.4287 $8.67
Frncey 2.2736 $8.12
Fac t- 1.6751 $5.98
Venezuela 1.4384 $5.13
Texas 1.4320 $5.11
Greece 1 0.0794 $0.28
Bolivia 0.0024 $0.01
Bear in mind that the differences in valuations among societies in the above table
are a direct result of their general concept of indigent defense.
141 Some societies
use a holistic approach,14 2 where both criminal and civil procedures are delivered
to indigents, and thus program expenditures are higher. Additionally, capital
offenses, such as death penalty cases, drive the need for additional expenditures.
Furthermore, the number, type, and seriousness of crimes (i.e., felonies versus
misdemeanors) facilitate the necessity for increased resources being allocated
and available for indigent programs.143 Although more than these variables assist
141 Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent
Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 Am. J. CRIM. L. 367, 416 (2004). In many international
debates concerning indigent defense, the United States is normally excluded due to its high
imprisonment rate. Compared to most nations, the U.S. incarcerates five times as many individuals.
Thus, the U.S. is on the extreme spectrum of any comparison.
142 McKinney & Shao, supra note 8, at 146. Holistic programs (e.g., England, Wales, Canada,
and the Netherlands) for indigent defense not only focus on providing legal representation for the
accused, but also consider that it is important to treat the catalysts for criminal activities - lack of
resources, education, and social morality. The premise is that by eliminating or reducing these risk
factors, the rates of recidivism are also reduced and thereby the society invests in mitigating against
future undesirable actions.
143 The terms allocated and available hold considerable significance in indigent programs. A
governing body, such as a legislature, can allocate as much funds to a program as desired. However,
if funds are not available (e.g., an Executive Order reducing appropriations), then the allocation is
restricted. And, when funds are restricted, program modifications must be made. In essence, the
allocation serves as a budget setting the maximum spending plan whereas the available functions
28
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in shaping the final organizational structure of the indigent defense program,
those variables are considered micro-macro issues that must be addressed
separately within their respective societies.14 4 However, despite their differing
roles of commitment, the goal of indigent defense programs is the same-to
render legal services to individuals that are accused of undesirable actions that
also lack adequate resources to afford such services.14 5
D. The Restructuring of2008-2010
From 2008 to 2010, a great restructuring occurred with legal
representation programs that PDS administered in West Virginia. On July 1,
2008, the Indigent Defense Commission was established, abuse and neglect
claims were given priority, 14 6 and "[r]eimbursements after ninety days shall bear
interest from the ninety-first day at the legal rate in effect for the calendar year
in which payment is due."1 47
As required by West Virginia Code section 29-21-3b-g, the Commission
submitted their findings in its first report to the Legislature on January 15,
2009.148 In this report, five recommendations were made and are summarized
below: 149
to control the funding through the issuance and making available the necessary resources (i.e.,
cash, contractual and cooperative services, and knowledge) to conduct and satisfy the program
objectives, goals, and mission. To further clarify, in West Virginia, both governing bodies (i.e.,
Legislative and Executive) must work in tandem to achieve society's expectations based upon the
aggregate resources available to all programs. Thus, it is sometimes necessary to reduce available
to one program while making access to resources in another program greater.
144 The term "micro-macro" denotes an issue with attributes of both impacting a general study
on a smaller scale but also these variables may impact the subgroups of that study on a larger scale.
To use an example in this case, the number of capital cases that must be addressed within South
Africa's indigent defense program will drive up the need for resources significantly in South
Africa. However, those South African capital cases have little or no financial impact for West
Virginia indigent defense programs. In essence, South African capitil cases are a macro-variable
for South African society, but a micro-variable when comparing indigent defense programs as a
group. See generally McKinney & Shao, supra note 8.
145 See PUB. INTEREST LAW INITIATIVE ET AL., ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE: A SOURCE BOOK (2003), https://www.pilnet.org/component/docman/doc_download/49-
access-to-justice-in-central-and-eastem-europe-source-book.html.
146 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-3b (West 2020).
147 Id. § 29-21-13a(o).
148 INDIGENT DEF. COMM'N, PUB. DEF. SERS., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (2009) [hereinafter
IDC REPORT]. The IDC had roughly six months to review and submit this report.
149 PDS, 2010 Annual Report, supra note74, at 5. Many of these recommendations are similar
to the issues that the Legislative Auditor presented in multiple reports (see OLA, Preliminary).
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Activations of Public Defender corporations in the 4th, 16th,
17th, and 26th Judicial Circuits (effective July 1, 2009 or
sooner);15 0
Increase the hourly rate'5 ' of compensation to private appointed
counsel (effective July 1, 2009 or sooner);152
The WV Supreme Court and State Bar advise the Legislature
annually as to needed changes and improvements to the indigent
defense system, including recommending hourly rates for
private counsel;153
ISO IDC REPORT, supra note 148, at 3. The 4th being Wood and Wirt Counties with an office in
Parkersburg; the 16th covers Marion County with a location in Fairmont; 17th is Monongalia
County with an office in Morgantown; and the 26th being Lewis and Upshur Counties with an
office in Buckhannon. Additionally, the IDC notes that the activation of Public Defender
Corporations was recommended 10 years ago by the Legislative Audit and other individuals. Id. at
4. Todd Baucher, Wood County Public Defender Could be Appointed Soon, WTAP (Apr. 24,2015,
6:48 PM) https://www.wtap.com/home/headlines/Public-Defender-Office-Coming-To-Wood-
County-28809892 1.html. Blaine Myers is serving as the Chair of the Board for the Public Defender
Corporation for the 4th judicial Circuit. Id.
1s' IDC REPORT, supra note 148, at 2 (recommending "$75 for out of court and $105 for in
court work" (emphasis added)).
152 Ralph E. McKinney, Jr., Reimbursement Rate Calculations of Current Value (from 1990 to
2008) (2008). This is also Appendix B of the IDC, Report 2009. Considering that appointed
counsel rates had not changed since 1990 after Jewell v. Maynard 383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989),
the aim of this study that was subsequently integrated into the Indigent Defense Commission
Report to the Legislature in 2009 was to provide a conservative estimate of the hourly rates of $45
out-of-court and $65 in-court in a more current form. Id. at 2. The conservative estimate was $87.05
and $126.22 respectfully. Id. at 11. The final estimate did not consider case complexity or case
type nor did it consider geographic location, it simply considered that the economics of 2008 were
different than 1990. Id. at 3. As such, three methods of calculating rates were undertaken. First, the
annual inflation/deflation estimates of the Consumer Price Index were applied to the 1990 rates
(id at 4) which equated to $73.45 and $106.09. Id at 5. Second, the appointed counsel were
"comparable [to other similar] positions as detailed from the WV Division of Personnel" (id. at 6
(emphasis added)) which projected that the final average hourly estimate without any overhead
was $29.44 to $68.47. Id. at 9. Third, the salaries of attorneys in prosecutors and legislative
positions were examined. Id. at 10.
Knowing that members of the appointed counsel earned less than many of their peers and that
some members (as noted in the prior section) may be motivated to engage in unethical billing
practices and illegal activities, the strategic initiative was to increase the hourly rate and reduce the
motivation to claim "phantom" hours. This seems counterintuitive as higher rates would likely
increase the motive to engage in unethical practices. The increased rates would effectively reduce
the disparity between appointed counsel and their peers which would re-establish the value that
society places on their services. In addition to the rate increases, better metrics would be established
to deter fraudulent behaviors. So the increase in rates was only part of the strategic initiative for
changing the system.
's3 IDC REPORT, supra 148, at 8. Requiring the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
and the West Virginia State Bar annually advocate rate changes is a more effective method of
achieving changes. Although PDS has the primary mission in overseeing indigent defense
programs, the hourly rates continued to stagnate at the 1990 levels. As such, new strategic plans
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PDS should devise a system to alert judges to private counsel
billings which appear to be consistently higher than average and
local panels of attorneys should be defined; 154 and
Indigent defense lawyers to be required to complete a minimum
number of relevant CLE hours.5 5
"Of these recommendations, PDS has been able to implement the fourth
item, i.e., report of private counsel billing. The remaining recommendations
require action by the Legislature, the Supreme Court of Appeals, or the West
Virginia State Bar."1 5 6 Not all members of the IDC agreed with the 2009
Report.157 Bill Richardson properly notes that "the goal should not be to establish
the cheapest system but the concern should focus on the quality of
representation."5 Much of the previous studies and reports focus on the
financial effectiveness of systems with limited investigations and examinations
of the quality of legal representation being delivered. He further notes that there
are differences amongst the judicial circuits that cannot be explained and as such
require further investigation.15 9
were developed, and it was deterined that PDS must seek a greater cooperation with the legal
community in order to bring changes to the system and ultimately indigent defense.
154 Id at 9. It was noted that sometimes judges do not follow the statutory guidelines for
appointing legal representation. Moreover, the local panel of attorneys has not been defined by
statute and as such the IDC recommends that "persons residing in the county or Circuit" be added
to the statutory language. Id
' Id. at 2. Although this report suggests that "[t]he West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
and the West Virginia State Bar should recommend the appropriate number of hours" (id. at 9),
some discussions centered on establishing an additional hourly rate (e.g., $10 more per hour) on
the base rates for those attorneys completing this training. Consequently, the dual rates would
likely complicate the processing of vouchers and issuance of payments. Moreover, the dual rates
may impact appointment processes not necessarily for the good of the accused. It was these primary
reasons, along with the express need to establish a coalition of advocates, in seeking a single rate.
Furthermore, it would be difficult for PDS to implement mandatory Continuing Legal Education
without the support of the two organizations, so it is essential that both work together in
establishing the necessary continuing legal education requirements for indigent defense. Id. at 9-
10.
156 McKrNNEY, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 104, at 25. PDS uses its website to produce reports
that identify the "top billers" to all interested parties.
15 IDC REPORT, supra note 148, at 338. Bill Richardson presented the Statement of Opposition
to Indigent Defense Commission Report to address certain aspects of the 2009 Report which he
disagreed. Id
158 Id. at 339.
159 IDC REPORT, supra note 148, at 338. Richardson's observations focus on the per capita
disparities amongst the judicial circuits with respect to cases. Id. This is correct, but there are also
income disparities and other economic factors not considered in per capita studies. These variables
have already been defined. See McKinney & Shao, supra note 132. Furthermore, the IDC was in
the process of addressing the quality of legal representation and subsequently issued Performance
standards on May 12, 2010. Richardson was correct in the fact that limited studies on the quality
of legal representation in West Virginia settings have been conducted.
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To help focus on the mission of providing high quality legal
representation by the West Virginia Public Defender Services, the Indigent
Defense Commission established and adopted five core values at its meeting on
February 22, 2009 applicable to both Public Defender Corporations and Private
Panel Attorneys:
Justice: In the broad sense, should include a right resolution to
every dispute; a fair result. Clearly includes procedural as well
as substantive fairness. Implies at minimum a responsibility for
adequate investigation; legal knowledge; funding for support
services; and time to prepare so as to allow for constitutionally
adequate representation.
Accountability: Implies responsibility to do the job right at a
reasonable cost without sacrificing adequate representation;
includes a duty to the client, to fellow workers, to the legal
system and to the taxpayers.
Quality: A level of representation that may be difficult to
articulate but is objective in some sense. Implies not just the best
possible effort under the circumstances but rather a goal of
genuinely adequate representation. May be subject to debate
about strategy used but implies a level of competence and
dedication that is measurable.
Integrity: A clear commitment to doing the right thing for the
right reasons. Honesty, reliability, consistency, dedication to
duty, a passion for doing the job to the best of one's ability.
Should infuse the culture of every law office.
Responsiveness/Efficiency: A clear-headed sense of priorities
and a dedication to reacting quickly with both sureness of
purpose and adequacy of work. In dollars and sense, a
commitment to providing the very best service for the most
reasonable cost.
1 0
After these core values were adopted, the Indigent Defense Commission
sought to establish performance standards concerning the minimum expectations
for legal representation of indigents.16 1 It was anticipated that a qualitative
160 IDC REPORT, supra note 148. This process took a couple of months to complete. The
Commission was presented with numerous research materials, operational plans, and general
discussions. To help the Commission, Phyllis H. Subin, Esq. of New Mexico was brought in to
facilitate the meetings and assist with keeping the meetings focused on the Legislative objectives.
161 These standards were largely based upon the American Bar Association, Standards for
Criminal Justice-Prosecution Function and Defense Function Third Edition (1993). It was the
Chief Defenders along with the Indigent Defense Commission and selected PDS staff that were
responsible for the adopted West Virginia Performance Standards.
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methodology would be developed to measure these standards. At this time, no
formal metrics have been devised.
In the next section, a general overview of the evolution to legal
representation is presented.
V. TENSIONS ARISING IN A MIXED SYSTEM: GIDEON'S (UN)BROKEN
PROMISE?
Before Gideon, champions for the right to legal counsel were already
making great strides in establishing effective delivery systems from California1 62
to New York.1 6 3 It was Gideon's case that represented so many previous
injustices1 64 that brought the concept of indigent defense to the front line. Thus,
the right to counsel entails that legal representation be provided, but there are
still many more issues to address-quality of legal representation being the most
difficult to quantify in a simple numeric expression.165 If one cannot make
comparisons, one cannot justify existence.
Consider the evolution of indigent criminal defense programs.16 6 During
oppressive government regimes, these programs are at best virtually non-
existent. When that society becomes dissatisfied with the current political and
social environment, the society shifts towards valuing property rights,167 the
ability for individual advancement, and the ability to earn a living-basic
property rights as society moves towards a free market economy. This movement
triggers discussions and the protection and public funding of basic rights
162 Benner, supra note 24, at 173.
163 Reynolds, supra note 25, at 477.
16 Nicola Sacco, Bartolomeo Vanzetti (Warner, supra note 27, at 266), Charles F. Stielow, and
Alfred Schwitofsky (Goldman, supra note 28, at 131-132).
165 It has been author McKinney's experience that leaders of governing bodies want to know
how the program is performing in relationship to its mission, allocation of resources, and other
similar programs. Rightly so. With taxpayer funds, a fiduciary relationship of trust must be
maintained amongst the involved parties. A system of checks and balances to ensure that resources
are directed at the programs society needs, expects, and requires. As a result, indigent defense
competes for the same resources as Highways, Education, Senior Citizens, Medicaid, and many
other desperately needed programs. As such, administrators of indigent defense programs have
always struggled to measure a complexity of variables. Most studies have used per capita figures
as the best available measurements. As noted earlier, a more common unit known as GDP-PPP can
be used in a general macro comparison. See McKinney & Shao, supra note 132. Furthermore, a
more comprehensive method of analysis is needed to consider the smaller segments (i.e., the 31
Judicial Circuits) of West Virginia. Unfortunately, this methodology is beyond the scope of this
paper.
166 Ralph E. McKinney, Jr., A Global Perspective on Funding the Right to Counsel: An
Overview of Criminal Defense Programmes 30 (June 21, 2012).
167 This extends to due process rights including liberty and freedom from unlawful
imprisonment and, in some instances, death.
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including protection against wrongful imprisonment.168 These early indigent
defense programs start out with volunteers and move towards private and
contracted attorneys. As expenses increase, programs are redefined to identify
methods of cost avoidancel6 9 and the move towards salaried attorneys
specializing in criminal law takes place.
170 In fact, a mixture of salaried and
private attorneys, as in West Virginia, can form a comprehensive delivery system
that enhance quality.1
7 1
However, sometimes systems within a society de-evolve, deregulate, or
become non-existent.17 2 In some cases, a society may shift its values and seek
greater rewards and invest in other programs such as education, health care,
crime prevention, infrastructure and so forth. With respect to indigent defense,
limitations (e.g., eligibility, funding, and quality of legal representation) are
introduced to deter use.17 3 Consider this:
Funding decisions for the indigent defense system, moreover,
have been left in the hands of local officials who, chafing under
an unfunded mandated imposed by the federal Constitution,
understandably desire to spend only the bare minimum
necessary to keep the system functioning. Most defendants
plead guilty because of the pressures created by a system of plea
bargaining in which no penalty is imposed upon a prosecutor
who overcharges to increase the incentive to plead. Thus, only
enough funding to the "presumed guilty" is deemed
necessary.
17 4
One observer, David E. Patton, notes that procedural differences in the
Federal criminal system since 1963 have eroded many of the Gideon-era
168 McKinney, supra note 166, at 31.
169 The term cost avoidance is, in author McKinney's opinion, a better concept that cost
savings. Savings implies that after expenditures are taking into account, some resources remain.
Any remaining resources may then either be re-appropriated to the program or reallocated for
consumption in other programs. With cost avoidance, the expectation and strategy is towards cost
minimization through the efficient delivery of programs that do not jeopardize the quality of legal
services. With cost avoidance, no resources truly remain for use in other programs. Essentially,
cost avoidance considers the opportunity cost in delivering similar services and makes the selection
to use the least amount of resources in acquiring the greatest benefit. But unlike basic procurement
and contract law, you cannot unilaterally cancel someone's Constitutional Rights.
170 McKinney, supra note 166, at 31.
171 Id. Author McKinney believes that the existence of the appointed counsel and Public
Defender Corporation systems in West Virginia provide additional value to an indigent defense
program. Like the United States Senate and House of Representatives, these systems must work in
conjunction for changes in organizational structure and procedures to occur.
172 Id. at 32.
173 Id.
174 Benner, supra note 24, at 207.
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assumptions-the emphasis now is less on trial advocacy and more on plea
bargaining.175 In Patton's words,
The daily injustices are staggering, the choices absurd: plead
guilty at the first appearance and get out of jail, or contest your
guilt and sit in jail for months awaiting trial; post bail or get a
lawyer, but not both; take the deal or roll the dice as one of your
public defender's two hundred to three hundred clients.176
Simply put, the convergence of administrative delays, large caseloads,
and lack of resources1 77 have created a system of inefficiency and coercion, with
a resultant denial of constitutional rights. As Patterson describes the Federal
system, Schlesinger describes similar occurrences within State systems.
[T]he extent of the state's involvement in the public defender
system helps establish state action. The state prescribes their
selection and appointments; and determines the attributes of
indigency. Through these activities, the State exercises
substantial influence over the size of a public defender caseload.
Hence, the State controls the amount of time a public defender
can devote to any particular case, and thus directly affects the
quality of an indigent's representation. Therefore, the conduct
of public defenders constitutes state action because the State has
made itself a party to the representation and has elected to place
its power, property, and prestige behind the public defender's
action. 178
According to these accounts, Patton and Schlesinger articulate that both
the Federal and State systems have fallen short in achieving Gideon's promise.
"Other professions and industries-from engineering to aviation, medicine, and.
's David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age ofInquisition, 122 YALE L.J. 2578, 2581
(2013).
176 Id. at 2602.
1' John Pollock & Michael S. Greco, It's Not Triage If the Patient Bleeds Out, 161 U. PA. L.
REv. PENNUMBRA 40 (2012). Simply adding more resources and creating more programs needing
resources does not solve the issues at hand with indigent defense funding. Id. at 48. Resources must
be used in efficient ways that make meaningful contributions to cases. Not every case needs an
expert witness or an investigator. In cases of same-crime recidivism, experts and investigators may
prove detrimental to the defendant. Furthermore, not all cases need legal representation. Id at 50-
51. In West Virginia, only eligible proceedings (e.g., jailable offenses) are provided counsel in
certain instances.
78 Schlesinger, supra note30, at 1300. This is part of Schlesinger's analysis between Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), and Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312
(1981). Although this was done some 33 years ago, his statement describes the current West
Virginia Public Defender System indigent program. Overall, PDS provides eligibility guidelines
for indigence determination. For the Public Defender Corporations, PDS approves an operational
guideline which includes the staff numbers and types of positions.
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car manufacturing-appear to be far ahead of the legal profession in trying to
design systems that do not depend upon the characteristics of the individual
professional to reach a reliable outcome."l
7 9
To improve and enhance indigent representation, it is suggested that
efforts be focused in three areas.' First, the development and implementation
of quality guidelines and checklists can help standardize expectations and
practices.1'8 Second, enhanced discovery in criminal proceedings.'1
8 2 Third,
reconfiguring the delivery of legal defense to incorporate more non-lawyer
professions (e.g., investigators, paralegals, social workers) while requiring
specialization for criminal defense attorneys.1
8 3 While three recommendations
have been made, the system in which legal representation is delivered also needs
attention.
Anderson and Heaton conducted an extensive study consisting of 2,459
defendants charged with murder in the jurisdiction of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
where a mixed system operated.1
8 4 The study suggests that Public Defender
systems are more favorable to defendants than appointed counsel systems.1
85 In
this study, the evidence suggests that if all defendants were assigned legal
179 James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Diference Does the Lawyer Make? The
Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 209 (2013). This
statement highlights the fact that indigent defense systems rely on the individual attorney being
qualified and successful and the need to enact risk minimization against human error. Insomuch to
say that teamwork is a better method to deploy against erroneous judgements. Id at 209.
Considering that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), requires that the attorney's
effectiveness be brought into question, the lack of progressively modifying the legal system with
safeguards to ensure that the accused has adequate processes that improve legal representation is
unsettling. Id. at 210.
180 Id. at 209.
181 Id. at 210. In fact, the West Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, the Chief Defenders of
the 17 Public Defender Corporations, and PDS completed and adopted those standards on May 12,
2010. Unfortunately, since 2013, PDS has done little to further disseminate and support a wider
acceptance of those Performance Standards. Id.
182 Id. at 211. It is suggested that discovery be similar to civil proceedings where evidence and
testimony are examined more extensively in pretrial setting and with less emphasis "on trial skills
and cross-examination on the fly." Id. (emphasis added). This would decrease uncertainty in the
reliance of information and would likely result in quicker dispositions of cases from plea
agreements. Id.
183 Id. Essentially shifting the paradigm in which legal representation in criminal proceedings
would take a greater team focus. Id Integrating non-lawyers would allow for greater specialization
among team members and thus place less emphasis on the "one-man band." In fact, the Public
Defender Corporations in West Virginia do operate more in a team setting. With respect to
specialized training, the CLRC is responsible for providing such services to interested parties.
Consequently, specialized training is not required in indigent representation although this was the
fifth recommendation of the Indigent Defense Commission in their 2009 Report to the Legislature.
Movement towards mandated requirements stalled in 2013.
184 Id. at 159.
185 Id at 212.
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representation from a defender association and not appointed counsel, defendants
would in the aggregate see "a decrease of 6,400 years" while the State would
avoid "prison costs for these crimes by over $200 million."l 8 6 Furthermore, "the
causes of this disparity are incentive structures created by the appointment
system and a resulting failure of appointed counsel to prepare cases as thoroughly
as the public defender."'8 7
In effect, resources that could be utilized for fulfilling Gideon's promise
are expended on the inefficiencies in providing legal representation, appeals
resulting from the ineffectiveness of counsel,s8 8 and consistent efforts to justify
constitutionally mandated protections.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In West Virginia, a delivery system similar to Philadelphia's exists with
the Public Defender Corporations and the appointed counsel. These systems are
intended to complement one another, with the Public Defender Corporations
being the preference for appointments and the appointed counsel serving where
conflict of interests arise and in areas in which no Public Defender Corporation
is activated. There have been no shortage of studies and arguments of which
system provides better representation and saves the State money. Some of these
discussions lack the rigor of methodology, the robustness of evidence, and the
epistemology of the subject material. While the discussions concerning indigent
legal representation are welcome, the blatant disregard for the accused, the
Constitution, and society is not.
With any publicly funded program, concerns arise over scarce resources.
Scarce resources mean that the allocation of resources to one program means
another program is not funded. Scarcity of resources mandates that we act in a
fiducially responsible manner that considers the stakeholders-the public as a
whole and not the special interest groups. Sometimes, you just have to Do The
Right Thing.18 9
There is a simple solution to the funding crisis that seems to occur each
year during the West Virginia Legislative session-"how much supplemental
186 Id at 212.
187 Id. at 213.
188 Emily Rose, Note, Speedy Trial as a Viable Challenge to Chronic Underfunding in Indigent-
Defense Systems, 113 MICH. L. REv. 279, 290 (2014). Rose suggests that the Sixth Amendment
right to speedy trial is a better basis for challenging underfunding in indigent defense. Id. at 279.
Moreover, the speedy trial can reduce caseloads for attorneys providing indigent defense services
and create a greater need for prosecutors to resolve cases. Id at 314. Richard Klein, The Eleventh
Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,
68 IND. L.J. 363 (1993). Klein argues for an increased use of asserting Sixth Amendment rights
instead of using the ineffective assistance counsel argument. Id. at 409. It is not the single attorney
but the system itself that needs correcting. Id
89 DO THE RIGHT THING (Universal Pictures 1989).
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funding does PDS need?" With a decentralized system where judicial circuits
appoint legal counsel in which the appointed counsel operate autonomously and
have limited to no incentive to consistently report their financial needs to PDS,
how can PDS reasonably anticipate the claims? At best, appointed counsel can
report on an annual basis their accrued receivables.
190
Public Defender Corporations submit operational plans annually-
detailing personnel compensation and anticipated expenditures. Public Defender
Corporations also submit monthly reports concerning expenditures and the need
for resources. There are no vouchers to process or review by either PDS or the
court.191 Public Defender Corporations can operate under a team approach for
the accused. Also, Public Defender Corporations do not necessarily have to
consider political retaliation for advocacy in court.
192 Furthermore, the presence
of a Public Defender Corporation in a community establishes and reinforces the
societal expectation of protecting constitutional rights.
193
When asked which system (i.e., a Public Defender or appointed counsel)
provides better legal representation, efficient use of resources, and ease of
management, it is by far a Public Defender system. Further, the authors believe
that an appointed counsel system operating alongside a Public Defender system
190 Each year around June, PDS issues a request for appointed counsel to report their Accrued
Liability to the Agency. The response to this request is not great.
191 Salaried Public Defenders are not compensated for additional hours and as such have no
real financial motivation to intentionally report erroneous hours. From my experience, hours
reported by attorneys of Public Defenders Corporations are usually underreported since their
primary focus is on indigent defense and not split between the clients' defense and making claims
against the State.
192 See PATRICIA PURITZ & ROBIN WALKER STERLING, NAT'L Juv. DEF. CTR., WEST VIRGINIA:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY COURT 5 (2010), https://njdc.info/wp-
content/uploads/2013/1 /WestVirginia Assessment-FINAL.pdf ("In each county visited, there
was a clear emphasis on the importance of civility, inside and outside the courtroom, that in practice
seemed to translate into less diligent legal advocacy by defense attorneys. In some of the counties
that operate on a contract system, other courtroom actors have the power to appoint attorneys to
cases; defense counsel in those counties expressed an unwritten rule that they should be careful not
to cultivate a reputation as 'too adversarial or too aggressive,' and that often providing even
minimal or basic legal assistance, such as filing motions or taking cases to trial, was considered
adversarial or aggressive.").
193 Part of the strategic initiative in protecting constitutional rights is the stability in maintaining
and ensuring a perpetual entity such as a Public Defender Corporation. This includes several
components. The longevity of employment seeks to maintain knowledge and skills of qualified
personnel whose skillsets expedite processes efficiently. The ownership of property moves the
organization from being seen as an outside stakeholder to being seen as a community shareholder
with a vested interest in each client's case. Furthermore, moral management-valuing employees
as people-is essential for maintaining good rapport and building strong relationships with
interested parties (especially within local communities). Immoral managers, who view employees
as nothing more than production units, and amoral managers, who treat employees as well as law
requires, can cause damage to any system. If there is a "chum and burn" philosophy, then conflict
and issues are sure to follow.
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adds significant value by taking conflict of interest cases, overflow cases, and
general assistance to the program. With all organizations, sometimes it is
necessary to have temporary help and outsource some functions; but it is never
necessary to outsource all operations. The basic concept is "justice for all."l 9 4
194 METALLICA, ... AndJusticeforAll, on ... AND JUSTICE FOR ALL (Elektra Records 1988).
2020] 879
39
McKinney and Baker: Indigent Defense in West Virginia: A Historical Look at Public De
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2020
40
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss3/8
